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Abstract
We analyze the economic factors which have contributed to the dramatic decline of
the employment share of unskilled labor in German manufacturing, in particular the
role played by the relatively rigid earnings structure.  Potential effects of intensified
international competition and skill–biased technological change on the relative
employment and earnings position of unskilled workers are also discussed.  We find
that the substitution elasticity between unskilled and skilled labor is rather low.  The
decline in the employment share of unskilled workers attributable to an inflexible
earnings structure therefore seems to have been modest compared to the trend
decline in the skills ratio.  We also find some modest effects from international
competition and technological change on the employment share of unskilled labor.
JEL classification: J23, J31
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Non–technical Summary
The U.S. labor market and its employment performance over the last twenty years or
so is often cited as a model for some of the European countries, and Germany in
particular.  While the U.S. economy has been more successful in creating jobs for
the unskilled than the German economy, this seems to have come at the cost of a
dramatic increase in earnings inequality in the U.S. which has hardly changed in
Germany.  These differential labor market developments in the U.S. and Germany
seem to support the hypothesis of a trade–off between more jobs for unskilled
workers on the one hand, and a less equal earnings distribution on the other.
However, the few empirical studies which try to test this hypothesis for various
countries have failed to provide conclusive results. For Germany, there has so far
been very little research on the empirical importance of this alleged trade–off.
In this paper, we analyze the economic factors which have contributed to the
dramatic decline of the employment share of unskilled labor in German
manufacturing, in particular the role played by the adjustment of relative earnings to
increased international competition and technological change. Although the
reduction in the relative supply of unskilled labor has certainly contributed to this
development, it is only part of the story.  The decline in the demand for unskilled
relative to skilled labor (skills ratio) has also played an important role.  On the basis
of a simple econometric model, we find a trend decline in the skills ratio in the
whole manufacturing sector of 3% per year.  The estimated substitution elasticity
from our preferred specification of the relative labor demand function implies that a
reduction of the earnings of unskilled relative to skilled workers by 10% would
increase the relative employment level of the unskilled on average by about 3%.
As to the potential effects of intensified international competition and technological
change, we have found some evidence for the hypothesis that the relative
employment of unskilled workers in industries with high import shares has declined
more strongly than in those little affected by international competition, but the size
of this effect is not dramatic.  There is also some evidence which seems to support
the hypothesis that the relative employment decline of unskilled workers in
industries characterized by relatively high rates of technological change has been
somewhat stronger than on average, but this effect, too, explains relatively little of
the overall decline in the skills ratio.
Given these estimates of the trend decline in the skills ratio and the substitution
elasticity, even reductions in the relative earnings of unskilled workers on a scale
observed for the U.S. labor market in the 1980's would not be sufficient to bring
employment of unskilled workers in West German manufacturing back to the levels
we observed in the past.  At best, feasible reductions in the relative earnings of4
unskilled workers would counter the further decline in the employment share of
unskilled labor to some extent.
"The rise in joblessness is thus the flip side of the rise in
earnings inequality in the U.S.  The two outcomes reflect
the same phenomenon—a relative decline in the demand
against the less skilled that has overwhelmed the long–
term trend decline the relative supply of less–skilled
workers. In the United States, where wages are highly
flexible, the change in the supply–demand balance low-
ered the wages of the less skilled. In Europe, where insti-
tutions buttress the bottom parts of the earnings distribu-
tion, the change produced unemployment."
(Freeman, 1995, p. 19)
1 Introduction
Nowadays it has become fashionable among economists and policy makers alike to
point to the U.S. labor market and its employment performance over the last twenty
years or so as a model for some of the European countries, and Germany in
particular.  Critics of this view do not dispute that, in terms of new jobs created, the
U.S. labor market has outperformed European countries by a wide margin, but stress
that employment growth in the U.S. has been concentrated on low–productivity jobs
in the service sector which do not earn enough to provide a decent standard of
living.  Empirical evidence for this assertion is provided by the widely documented
fact that earnings inequality in the U.S. has sharply increased since the early 1980's
due to the deterioration of the earnings position of unskilled labor relative to college
graduates.  In contrast, earnings inequality in welfare states of the type prevailing in
most western European countries has changed very little in this period.
Germany
1 is one particularly instructive example of a welfare state where the level
of unemployment markedly increased in the 1980's but the distribution of earnings
changed little (see Steiner and Wagner, 1996).  This raises the question, why?  After
all, the factors for the increase in earnings inequality usually cited in the literature,
such as changes in the demographic structure of the work force, international trade
with low–wage countries and skill–biased technological progress (for surveys of the
literature see, e.g., Levy and Murane, 1992; Burtless 1995) should have affected the
German and the U.S labor markets in a similar way. Conventional wisdom holds
that these factors have been accomodated by different price and quantity
adjustments in the two countries: whereas they have changed the wage structure in
                                          
1  Here and in the folllowing, Germany always refers to West Germany prior to unification in
1990.5
the United States, they have led to employment adjustment in Germany.  This
difference is usually explained by the much greater importance of institutional
factors in Germany, such as effective wage floors set by collective bargaining
agreements, unions’ "solidaristic wage policy" aiming at uniform relative wage
increases, and income support schemes characterized by high earnings replacement
ratios together with the widespread use of early retirement schemes (see, e.g.,
Abraham and Houseman, 1995, Siebert, 1997).
In this view, the differential labor market developments in the U.S. and Germany
support the hypothesis of a trade–off between more jobs for unskilled workers on
the one hand, and a less equal earnings distribution on the other.  However, very
little hard evidence seems to be available to support—or to reject—this hypothesis,
and the few empirical studies which exist in this area come up with inconclusive or
conflicting results.  For a small cross–section of developed market economies, the
OECD (1996) reports a significant negative relationship between unemployment
rates and a measure of the degree of inequality prevailing in the lower part of a
country's earnings distribution.  This correlation disappears, however, when first–
differences of unemploment rates and the inequality measure rather than their levels
are considered.  In a study covering a larger number of countries, Blau and Kahn
(1996) find that employment ratios of low–skilled workers are lower in countries
with a more compressed earnings distribution than the U.S., but this correlation
seems far from conclusive, to say the least.  After comparing the development of
relative unemployment rates and wages for various skill groups in a number of
OECD countries, Nickell and Bell (1995, p. 46) conclude that "there seems to be no
evidence for relationship between the unemployment rate effects [of the fall of the
relative demand for unskilled workers] are any more severe in countries where the
wage effects are small".  Furthermore, in an econometric comparative study
including the U.S., Canada and France, Card, Kramarz and Lemieux (1996) found
little evidence for the hypothesis that the more compressed earnings distribution in
France, which hardly changed in the observation period, generated significantly
different employment trends than in the other two countries characterized by a
higher degree of wage flexibility.  However, this seems to be at odds with the rather
high absolute values of the estimated substitution elasticity between skilled and
unskilled workers reported in Goux and Maurin (1996, 1997).
Except for the study by Krueger and Pischke (1997), who found no relationship
between the change in the employment–to–populations ratio disaggregated by a
small number of age–education cells and the respective wage in the base period, the
empirical relationship between relative employment growth and earnings inequality
has apparently not been analyzed for Germany so far. This paper tries to partially
fill this gap.  We analyze the economic factors which have contributed to the
dramatic decline of the employment share of unskilled labor in German
manufacturing, in particular the role played by the adjustment of relative earnings to6
increased international competition and technological change.  To this end, we
provide some theoretical and institutional background in section 2, while section 3
presents some stylized facts on employment and wage trends.  Section 4 contains a
brief description of the empirical model and the estimation results, and in section 5
we draw some conclusions.
2 Theoretical and Institutional Background
The supply of unskilled workers and their share in overall employment have
markedly decreased in developed economies over time.  In most of these countries,
this development was accompanied by a concomitant deterioration of the earnings
position of unskilled relative to skilled workers, for which the U.S. economy is the
typical example.  On the other hand, in Germany the decline in the relative supply
and employment of unskilled labor was particularly strong, but the earnings
distribution changed little.  These stylized facts can be explained by differential
shifts in the relative demand for skills overcompensating the decline in the relative
supply and country differences in the adjustment of relative wages.  Hence, one
needs to identify the economic factors affecting the relative demand for skills and
the institutional factors explaining the differences in labor market adjustments.
Given that shifts in the relative demand for skills have led to the observed trends in
the employment of unskilled labor, what are the economic forces for these demand
shifts?  Since the deterioration of the relative labor market position of unskilled
workers is a long–time phenomenon, it seems unlikely that cyclical factors could
have played an important role in this development.  The main candidates among the
factors which may have reduced the demand for unskilled labor are international
competition and skill–biased technological change.  These factors are likely to be of
special importance in the case of Germany because its economy is highly dependent
on international trade in manufactured goods which embody a high degree of human
capital.
The partial–equilibrium effects of more intense international competition, usually
viewed as an increase in the share of imports from low–wage countries
("globalization"), and technological change on the relative employment and
earnings position of unskilled workers in the domestic economy can be analyzed on
the basis of a straightforward extension of the standard demand–supply framework
(see, e.g., Nickell and Bell, 1995, Goux and Maurin, 1997).  These effects depend
on the slope of the relative demand curve for unskilled and skilled labor, that is the
substitution elasticity between these two groups, the position and slope of their
respective supply curves, and the extent to which trade and technological shocks
shift the relative demand curve for labor.  This depends on the pricing behavior of
firms and the effects of these shocks on relative output prices, which are typically7
not modelled within this partial–equilibrium setting.  The extent to which
reductions in the relative demand for skills will be transmitted into, respectively, a
lower employment share and a deterioriation of the relative earnings position of the
unskilled will depend on wage setting behavior and thus the structure of the labor
market.
This partial equilibrium analysis has been criticized by trade economists who stress
the general–equilibrium effects of increased international trade on the domestic
labor market (see, e.g., Richardson, 1995, Leamer, 1996; for a survey see Burtless,
1995).  Here, the analysis is usually cast in terms of a slightly modified version of
the Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) model of international trade with two
countries using, respectively, unskilled and skilled labor intensively in the
production of two goods.  In this framework, changes in relative product prices are
the main channel through which trade affects the domestic labor market.  Hence, the
relationship between relative earnings and employment shares of unskilled and
skilled labor on the one hand, and relative product prices on the other play the
central role in the HOS world.
Assuming the domestic economy is richly endowed with skilled labor and thus has a
comparative advantage in the production of skill–intensive ("high–tech") goods, the
opening–up of trade with low–skill countries ("globalization") will result in an
increase of the relative price of the high–tech good.  Given flexible relative wages,
this, in turn, will decrease the earnings of unskilled relative to skilled labor and
increase the employment share of unskilled workers, the skills ratio for short, in
both sectors. In the new equilibrium, both groups of workers will be fully employed.
The adjustment of the labor market to "globalization" by changes in relative wages
rather than (un–)employment has been termed the "American scenario" and
contrasted to the "European scenario" by Krugman (1995a).  In this world, relative
wages are inflexible and globalization does not change relative prices.  Not
surprisingly, the skills ratio in both sectors of the domestic economy also remains
unchanged and, since the demand for domestically produced low–tech goods is
reduced, employment of unskilled labor declines and unemployment results.
The labor market effects of skill–biased technological change also differ between
these two scenarios (Krugman, 1995b, Landmann and Pflüger, 1996).  In the
"American scenario", unskilled labor–saving technological change will reduce
relative earnings as well as the skills ratio in both sectors of the domestic economy
without increasing unemployment among the unskilled.  In the "European scenario",
skill–biased technological change will reduce the skills ratio in both sectors and,
given the assumed inflexibility of relative wages, will increase unemployment
among unskilled workers.8
To sum up, in theory both increased international competition and skill–biased
technological change may affect relative earnings and/or employment of unskilled
workers, and these effects crucially depend on assumptions about wage setting
behavior.  However, there is no agreement on the relative importance of these
factors.  In fact, it's not even clear whether the labor market effects of intensified
trade and technological change can be identified separately, since the former should
affect the latter and vice versa (see, e.g., Richardson, 1995, Wood, 1995).
Some attempts have been made to empirically distinguish between these effects,
where most studies are concerned with wage rather than employment effects of
international trade and skill–biased technological change.
2  Most empirical studies
for the U.S. seem to conclude that skill–biased technological change rather than
higher imports from low–wage countries have contributed to a deterioration of the
relative earnings or employment position of unkilled workers. However, it seems
fair to say that the evidence in favor of the technological change argument is
anything but conclusive, not the least because most authors simply equate this factor
with the unobserved variation within skill groups and/or industries or, in a
regression framework, to the unexplained residual.
In Germany, the earnings distribution has changed very little in the 1980's, if at all
(Steiner and Wagner, 1996), and there also seem to have been little changes over
the longer term (Becker, 1996).  The small increase in earnings inequality which
occurred in the second half of the 1980's was not related to a widening earnings
differential between skilled and unskilled labor; if anything, the return to an
occupational qualification relative to unskilled work even decreased in this period
(Steiner and Wagner, 1996).  Given these facts, it comes as no surprise that
Fitzenberger (1996) finds no negative effects from technological change and trade
on the relative earnings position of unskilled relative to skilled workers.
3
                                          
2  See, e.g., Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992); for summaries see Levy and
Murnane (1992), and Burtless (1995).  Since this literature primarily focuses on the U.S. labor
market where these shocks are mainly absorbed by the adjustment of relative wages, their
employment implications are typically not explicitely discussed very much (an exception is the
study by Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994).  However, the results of these studies naturally
have direct implications for the determination of the employment of unskilled relative to skilled
labor as well.  In contrast, the German literature stresses the (un–)employment effects of
international competition and technological change (see, e.g., Hesse, 1996, Blattner, 1996),
although there is little empirical evidence on these effects available for Germany.
3  As to the effect of technological change on relative earnings, the results obtained by
Fitzenberger (1996) are in conflict with those reported in Möller (1996), which seem to be
affected by measurement error in the earnings variable, however (see Steiner and Wagner,
1996).9
The difference between the labor market response in Germany and the U.S. to
increased import competition from low–wage countries and skill–biased
technological change is usually portrayed as quantity versus price adjustment in the
labor market, that is higher unemployment or non–employment rates of unskilled
workers on the one hand, and increasing earnings inequality on the other.  The
rigidity of the German earnings structure is typically explained by the greater
importance of institutional regulations, i.e. strong German trade unions and income
support schemes (see, e.g., Abraham and Houseman 1995, Siebert, 1997).  Some
institutional background on the German bargaining and welfare system therefore
seems appropriate here.
In contrast to the U.S., German wage bargaining is centralized and characterized by
stong unions organized by industry and region.
4  Even though only about one third
of all German workers are union members, coverage of wages by collective
bargaining agreements is quite widespread.  In member firms of an employers'
organization covered by a collective bargaining agreement the contract wage is
usually also paid to non–union members of the workforce, although this is not
legally binding.  For whatever reason, many firms not formally belonging to an
employers' organization also pay the bargained industry wage.  Furthermore, the
Federal Minister of Labor and Social Affairs can make the contract wage also
binding for non–member firms in case such a regulation is considered to be in "the
public interest" provided representatives of the collective bargaining parties chosen
from other industries unanimously agree.  One of the official aims of some of the
German unions, especially the powerful metal workers union which covers a large
part of the manufacturing sector, has been to follow a policy of equalizing
differences in earnings aiming at uniform relative wage increases, which is known
as "solidaristic" wage policy.
Another institutional feature which may excert some influence on the downward–
flexibility of earnings, especially for unskilled workers, is the German income
support system including early retirement schemes, unemployment insurance and
social assistance.
5  Early retirement schemes have been used extensively in the
1980's as a means of labor force adjustment, especially in the manufacturing sector.
At the same time, entitlement periods to unemployment benefits were extended
substantially for older workers and often used as a way to bridge the time before
reaching the earliest possible retirement age, usually at 60 years after a spell of
long–term unemployment. Depending on age and previous labor market experience,
benefit entitlement periods are quite long in Germany, and means–tested
                                          
4  For more detail on the German wage bargaining system see, e.g., Bellmann and Möller (1995)
and Franz (1995).
5  A good summary of the German welfare state is contained in Hauser (1995).10
unemployment assistance is open–ended in principle.  Furthermore, the coverage
rate of the German unemployment insurance system is relatively high by
international standards.
6  Those not covered by it can apply for social assistance,
which is means–tested and provides a minimum standard of living for the
household.  For families with children its level may well come close or even exceed
earnings of a full–time unskilled worker in the lower part of the distribution.
Although there is some suspicion that these measures have excerted an important
influence on wage setting and the level of unemployment in Germany (see, e.g.,
Siebert, 1997), there seems to be hardly any empirical evidence to support this
claim.
3 Some Stylized Facts
To set the scene for the following empirical analysis, we first present some stylized
facts on employment and earnings trends in West Germany. To begin with, we first
describe some general trends referring to the whole economy. For the reasons set
out below, most of the subsequently presented evidence refers to male workers in
manufacturing in the period 1975 to 1990, for which individual–level earnings
information differentiated by skills is available.
Between the recession year 1975 and the pre–unification year 1990, overall
employment in West Germany increased by almost 14% from 22,4 to 25,5 millions,
where the strongest increase occurred in the second half of the eighties, when about
2 million jobs net were created. Strongly influenced by the unification boom,
employment growth accelerated at the beginning of the nineties and West German
employment reached an all–time high of over 26 millions in 1992.  In 1993/1994,
the economy was hit by a severe recession resulting in large–scale employment
reductions. Between 1992 and 1996, employment dropped by about one million
persons and has now reached its pre–unification level.  Since labor supply increased
strongly throughout the period, even the relatively strong employment increase in
the second half of the eighties was insufficient to bring down overall unemployment
to its level before the recession of the early eighties.
7   In 1990, the unemployment
rate as measured by the OECD stood at 6%, compared with a level of 4% in the
recession year 1975.  It has increased to 8% after the recession in 1993/94.
8
                                          
6  The German unemployment insurance system is briefly described in Hunt (1995) and Steiner
(1997), who also analyze its effects on the duration of unemployment.
7  These and, if not otherwise stated, the following facts are taken from the Official Bulletin of the
Federal Labor Office (Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit), various issues.
8  Franz (1997) provides a comparative analysis of the German and U.S. labor markets.11
The increase of unemployment in the 1980’s mainly occurred among the unskilled
and older male workers.  The strong increase in female labor supply did not result in
higher unemployment of women, but an increasing share of female employment
throughout the period.  In the high–growth period in the second half of the 1980's
alone, the share of females in employment increased by 5 percentage points.  This
increase was both related to changes in educational attainment of females, the
expansion of the service sector and the extension of female part–time work.
Between 1985 and 1990 the service sector expanded by more than 2 million
employees, while the share of females in this sector increased from about 55 to 60
percent.  The share of part–time employed among all female employees increased
by about 5 percentage points to 36 percent in this period, where part–time
employment is concentrated in services and the public sector. 
9
In the period from the mid–1970's to the end of the 1980's, employment of unskilled
workers in the whole West German economy dropped by almost 36%, while the
number of skilled employees increased by 30%.  Employment losses for the
unskilled in manufacturing were markedly higher than in the service sector, but
even there employment of this group dropped by more than 20%.  Within the
manufacturing sector, these employment losses ranged from 35% in industries
producing investment goods to almost 50% in mining and energy production (see
Sachverständigenrat 1994, Table 51).
To what extent have demand and supply factors contributed to these employment
trends?  Based on a shift–share analysis, Abraham and Houseman (1995) try to
attribute the change in the relative demand for workers of different skill groups to
changes in the sectoral composition of employment.  They conclude that, due to
shifts in the sectoral distribution of employment, the demand for unskilled workers
markedly decreased, while the demand for workers with an occupational
qualification increased substantially in the 1970's.  According to their calculations,
the demand for skilled labor kept on increasing in the 1980's at roughly the same
pace as in the previous period, while the demand for unskilled labor stagnated.  On
the supply side, the share of the population aged between 20 and 60 years with an
occupational qualification (apprenticeship training and technical school degrees)
increased from 55% in the mid–seventies to about 63% at the end of the eighties,
while the percentage of unskilled people decreased from about 40% to about 28% of
the population (Abraham and Houseman, 1995, Table 11.10).
10
                                          
9  The mentioned facts on sectoral employment developments by gender are documented for the
period 1980 to 1994 in Steiner and Kaltenborn (1995).
10 The unskilled category also includes those who didn’t answer to the questions on educational
attainment.12
In the light of the general labor market developments described above, the German
unemployment problem seems to be closely related to the relative decline of
employment in manufacturing, in particular of unskilled males.  In the following,
we therefore focus on the development of skill–specific trends in employment and
earnings of males in the period 1975 to 1990.  The data set used here and also for
the regression analysis in the next section derives from merging data from the
disaggregated national accounts for two–digit manufacturing industries and
individual–level employment and earnings information from social security records
for the period 1975 to 1990.  The main advantage of the social security data for the
present purpose is that it allows us to calculate employment shares and earnings
ratios for meaningful skill groups and also by labor market experience.
11
Here we distinguish between three skill groups, namely unskilled workers, skilled
workers and graduates. We define workers as unskilled if they neither have obtained
a vocational qualification (apprenticeship) nor a degree in higher education.
Workers with a vocational degree and/or university entry level degree are classified
as skilled.  Graduates include those with an university degree or a polytechnical
degree.  While the number of skilled male workers in manufacturing slightly
increased after the recession in the mid–seventies and then remained fairly constant,
employment of unskilled labor decreased and of graduates increased throughout the
whole period. The employment decline of the unskilled also seems to have
accelerated in the eighties, while the growth in employment of graduates was
particularly strong in the second half of the decade.  Nevertheless, it seems unlikely
that graduates have been substituted for unskilled labor, and our interest in the
following will focus on the development of the ratio of unskilled workers to skilled
workers, the skills ratio for short.
Between 1975 and 1990, this average (male) skills ratio in manufacturing has
declined from 0.46 to 0.30 (see Figure 1). Although levels at the beginning of the
observation period and the time pattern differ substantially, the skill ratio exhibits a
strong negative trend in all manufacturing industries. Simple regressions show that
the skills rate declined by an average rate of almost 3% per year ranging from
almost 6% in the airlines industry to less than 0.2% in printing and publishing (the
coefficient of variation is 0.436). In contrast, the overall ratio of median earnings of
                                          
11 The differentiation between, respectively, production/non–production or blue–/white–collar
workers often found in the U.S. literature is, in our opinion, not a useful one, at least for the
German situation. Another possible differentiation used in German studies is based on the
qualification grouping ("Leistungsgruppen") found in collective bargaining agreements, which
differentiates between three blue–collar and four white–collar groups (see, e.g., Entorf, 1996 for
a recent study). However, this classification does not differentiate workers by their level of
labor market experience.13
unskilled to skilled workers in manufacturing remained fairly stable within the
observation period. We use median rather than average earnings here because the
latter are affected by the change in the coding of fringe benefits in the social
security data in 1983/84 (see the appendix). There are substantial differences in this
earnings ratio between manufacturing industries, which changed little over time.
Although absolute changes in the earnings ratio were generally very small, they do
differ between industries (the coefficient of variation is 2.1). For the 1980’s, the
overall stability of the earnings distribution has also been confirmed by Steiner and
Wagner (1996) who also show that the average earnings differential between skilled
and unskilled workers has become even slightly smaller in the observation period..
Figure 1 Skills ratio and earnings ratio in manufacturing (males).
Note: For the definition of industry classes see the appendix.
Source: IABS data, own calculations.
As mentioned in section 2, increased imports from low–wage countries may have
had negative effects on earnings and/or employment of unskilled workers.  To get
some indication on the existence of such effects, we have disaggregated the whole
manufacturing sector into four subsectors defined by the quartile an industry's
import share belongs to.
12  Figure 2 plots the development of the skill and earnings
ratios for the resulting four subgroups over time. There is still a strong overall
                                          
12  We divided the observation period into three sub–periods (1975 – 1979, 1980 – 1984, and 1985
– 1990) and compared the relative position of each industry over time. We found that there was
very little change in the industry ranking of import ratios in the observation period.14
negative trend of the skill ratio, but the relative decline of the share of unskilled
workers differs between these industry subgroups.  For the industries with the
lowest import share the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers declined by 29.6%,
while it dropped by about 40% in the 25% of industries with the highest import
shares.  On the other hand, the ratio of median earnings increased in industries with
relatively low import shares, while unskilled workers in industries more heavily
affected by international trade experienced a modest decline in their relative
earnings. Hence, the overall stability of the earnings ratio seems to result to some
extent from compensating trends in industries which are differently affected by
international competition.15
Figure 2 Skills ratio and earnings ratio for industries classified by import intensity.
     
     
Source: IABS data, own calculations.
As to the other factor which is generally considered to have played an important
role in the development of the relative employment and earnings position of
unskilled workers, no directly observable measures of technological change seems
to be available for Germany covering our observation period.
13  We therefore use a
measure of total factor productivity growth at the industry level as an indicator for
technological change here.  Based on this measure, we have grouped the two–digit
manufacturing industries into four subsectors defined by the average rate of total
factor productivity growth in the observation period.
14  As Figure 3 shows, the share
                                          
13 M öller and Bellmann (1996) use survey data on innovative activity collected by the ifo-institute,
Munich, and find some correlation between indicators of process and product innovation and
earnings differentials by broad skill group.  These data were not available to us.
14 We thank our colleague Bertrand Koebel for providing us with his calculations of total factor
productivity growth at the industry level.  The industries were grouped according to their16
of unskilled workers declined in all subsectors, although the relative decline in the
sector with the fastest growth rate of total factor productivity was much stronger
than in industries which experienced little technological change (41% versus 26%).
On the other hand, relative earnings of unskilled workers in these industries
increased somewhat while they remained fairly constant in those industries where
productivity growth increased most in the observation period.
Figure 3 Skills ratio and earnings ratio for industries classified by total factor productivity
growth.
     
     
Source: IABS data, own calculations.
                                                                                                                                         
growth rate of total factor productivity in an analogous way as explained for the import shares.
As has also been shown by Flaig and Steiner (1993), the rate of productivity growth in West
German manufacturing industries changed little between 1961 and 1985.17
4 Substitution between Unskilled and Skilled Labor
The main question we try to answer here is to what extent the decline in the relative
employment of unskilled labor in West German manufacturing industries in the
period 1975 to 1990 was affected by the development of relative earnings on the
one hand, and other economic factors on the other.  We rely on a simple partial–
equilibrium approach of the labor market as described in section 2.  Our working
hypothesis will be that the decline in the supply of unskilled male workers has
affected all manufacturing industries to a similar extent, and that employment is
mainly determined by the demand side of the labor market.
4.1  Empirical Model
Our empirical model relates the relative demand for unskilled and skilled workers to
their relative earnings and a number of other variables affecting the relative demand
for labor.  Such a model could be derived on the assumption of profit maximizing or
cost minimizing firms facing certain conditions in factor and output markets
(Hamermesh, 1993, pp. 33).  The model is estimated on the pooled data from about
30 manufacturing industries for the period 1975 to 1990. As already mentioned in
the previous section, a detailed data description is contained in the appendix.
To take differences in human capital within unskilled and skilled labor into account,
we have disaggregated these two groups by the level of labor market experience,
which is an important factor for both the determination of employment and
earnings.  In particular, economic change due to increased import competition or
technological change should mainly have affected older workers who find it more
difficult to adjust than workers with little labor market experience.  Furthermore,
individual earnings also increase substantially with labor market experience (for
Germany see, e.g., Steiner and Wagner, 1996), which may or may not reflect the
higher productivity level of more experienced workers.
The disaggregation of the two skill groups by their level of labor market experience
is based on the social security data described in the appendix. Given that a too fine
disaggregation would leave us with an insufficient number of observations in
certain industry∗ formal skill∗ experience cells, we use five experience groups, that
is less than six years, 6 – 15, 16 – 25, 26 – 35, and more than 36 years of labor
market experience.  This skill disaggregation gives us a maximum number of 2,400
observations for the whole time period (30 industries∗ 5 experience groups∗ 16
years).  In the estimation, observations referring to cells with less than 20 cases are
deleted from the sample.18
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The time trend should account for trending factors common to all industries, such as
the overall decline in the supply of unskilled labor and the effect of skill–biased
technological change affecting all industries similarily.  Aside from this trend and
the earnings ratio, other variables are also included in the vector Z to allow for the
possibility that other demand–side factors may affect the relative demand for
unskilled.  Depending on specific assumptions about firm behavior in an industry, Z
may alternatively include the real value of industry output or its price, the real stock
of capital or its relative price as well as the stocks or relative prices of other inputs
in production, such as energy or material.  To check the sensitivity of estimation
results, we will present results for various alternative specifications below.  The
fixed effect, α 0ie, should capture all other time–invariant factors which differ
between industries and experience groups, and which may or may not be correlated
with the other explanatory variables in the model.
Our interest here focuses on the coefficient on the earnings ratio, β  , which gives us
an estimate of the substitution elasticity between unskilled and skilled workers, that
is the percentage change of the skills ratio for a one–percent change in the earnings
ratio.  This substitution elasticity is conditional on the time trend and the variables
included in the vector Z as well as other factors accounted for by the fixed group
effects.  As specified in the equation above, the substitution elasticity is assumed to
be the same across all industries and experience groups.  In the estimations reported
below, we will also allow the substitution elasiticity to differ by an industry's import
intensity and growth rate of total factor productivity.  The maintained assumption
that substitution elasticities do not differ between experience groups admittedly is a19
rather restrictive one, but the data unfortunately do not allow for a more flexible
specification.
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4.2  Estimation Results
In Table 1 we present estimation results for various specifications of the model
described above for the whole manufacturing sector in the period 1975 to 1990.
The specifications differ with respect to the variables included in the vector Z. In all
regressions, group specific fixed–effects were highly significant and, according to
standard Hausman–tests (see, e.g., Greene, 1993, p. 479) correlated with the
regressors in the model. For example, in specification (1) an F–test on the
significance of the group–specific fixed effects yielded a value of F(109, 1550) =
100.9, while the Hausman–test clearly rejected the null–hypotheses that the
unobserved group–specific effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables
in the model (χ
2(5) = 78.36). Similar test statistics were also obtained for the other
specifications of the relative labor demand function reported in Table 1.  Hence, we
have estimated them conditional on the group–specific fixed–effects.
In specification (1) the skills ratio is regressed on a time trend, the earnings ratio,
the value of real output, its capital stock and the relative price of other inputs in that
industry. Hence, the estimating equation can be interpreted as a conditional relative
labor demand equation derived from cost–minimization with the level of output
given and capital treated as a quasi–fixed factor of production (see Flaig and
Steiner, 1993).  This specification yields an estimate of the substitution elasticity of
around –0.5.  The coefficient estimates on the real output and the real capital stock
seem rather imprecisely estimated, probably due to the high degree of positive
correlation between the two variables.  Since the two coefficients are of about equal
size but opposite sign, in specification (2) we have restricted them accordingly.
16
Given that substitution of capital for unskilled labor is more likely than between
capital and skilled labor, which could even be complements in production, we
expect a higher capital/output ratio to reduce the skills ratio in an industry.  The
estimated coefficient on this variable has the expected sign, although the effect is
not statistically significant.  The estimate for the substitution elasticity between
unskilled and skilled labor remains unaffected by this change in specification.  The
same holds for specification (3), where we do not condition on the level of output
but instead normalize the price of other inputs by the output price.  The substitution
elasticity is also not affected if we include the user costs normalized by the output
                                          
15 Due to the relatively small number of observations, separate estimation of the model for each
experience group yielded mostly insignificant parameter estimates.
16 An  F–test showed that this restriction is not rejected by the data, F(1, 1550) = 0.03.20
price rather than the capital stock as in specification (4).  The user costs of capital as
well as the prices of other inputs in production also seem to have no differential
impact on the relative demand for skills in this specification.
Since relative skills and their wages are determined together in the labor market,
one may suspect that the estimated substitution elasticity suffers from simultaneity
bias.  In specification (5) we have therefore instrumented the earnings ratio by its
lagged value.  On the assumption of no serial correlation in the error term, ε iet, this
should be a very good instrument given the high correlation in the earnings ratio.
As industy output and the capital stock are also potentially endogenous variables, in
specification (5) the capital/output ratio is instrumented by its lagged value as well
and the other insignificant variables are left out for efficiency reasons.  In this final
specification, the estimated substitution elasticity drops markedly to a value of –
0.321 (with a standard error of 0.095).  This suggests that the estimates in
specificatons (1) – (4) are indeed affected by simultaneity bias.  On the other hand,
the coefficient on the capital/output ratio increases somewhat in size and becomes
significant (at the 5% level), thus supporting the hypothesis on the differential
degree of substitution between capital and, respectively, unskilled and skilled labor.
Compared to the estimates of substitution elasticities between different types of
labor reported in the few other available studies (Schulte zur Surlage, 1985, Kugler,
Müller and Sheldon, 1988, Entorf, 1996, Möller, 1996) in West German
manufacturing, our preferred estimate from specification (5) seems to be rather low.
For example, Entorf (1996) estimates a substitution elasticity between skilled and
unskilled blue collar workers in manufacturing of about –1 for and, depending on
the specification, of between –1.5 and 0.5 (sic!) for white–collar workers.
However, with the exception of Möller (1996), these studies are based on highly
aggregated data, do not differentiate between males and females and rely on a rather
different grouping of employees by type of qualification.  These estimates are,
therefore, not directly comparable to the ones reported here.  On the basis of a
similar data set as used here, Möller (1996) reports an estimated substitution
elasticity of about –1.7 for West German manufacturing. Although it is difficult to
tell from his paper how he got to that number, a possible reason for the large
difference to our estimate could be that differences between experience groups were
not controlled for in his estimation.
17
                                          
17 When we included only industry fixed effects without differentiating between experience
groups our model yielded a very high substitution elasticity of about –2.3.  On the other hand,
treating the group effects as random instead of fixed had little effect on the estimated
substitution elasticities, although changed some of the estimated coefficients for the control
variables.  However, as indicated by formal tests referred to in the text, the random effects21
Table 1 Estimation results for alternative specifications of the relative labor demand




b) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
constant –.803** –.824** –.541** –.538** –.802**
(.331)
c) (.329) (.056) (.025) (.147)
trend –.031** –.031** –.030** –.030** –.032**
(.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001)
lnw
r –.511** –.511** –.521** –.521** —
(.094) (.094) (.093) (.093)
lnwt
r




lnk –.035 — .000 ——
(.071) (.042)
ln(k/y) —– .038 ———
(.069)












x) —— – .095 –.114 —
(.160) (.194)
# obs 1665 1665 1665 1665 1559
R
2 adj. .933 .933 .933 .933 .937
Notes:
a) dependent variable = ln(skills ratio) ≡  ln( / ) ll iet
unskilled
iet
skilled  as defined in the text
b) w ≡  ww iet
unskilled
iet
skilled /  = earnings ratio unskilled / skilled workers as defined in the text
w
m = median earnings
                                                                                                                                         
estimates are likely to be inconsistent. We also tried the first–difference estimator which yielded
an estimate of the substitution elasticity of –0.275, which is very close to our preferred estimate
from specification (5).22
y = real value of industry output
r
  p
x = output price
p
k = user costs of capital
p
m = price of material and energy
c) standard errors are given in parantheses below parameter estimates; a star "*“ indicates
significance at the 5% level, two stars "**“ at the 1% level.
In order to shed some light on sectoral differences with respect to the degree of
import competition and technological change, we report estimation results for the
respective subsamples of industries in Table 2.  As in the previous section, we have
split the sample according to the quartile into which an industry’s import share or
rate of productivity growth falls.  Here, we report estimation results for industries
with low, middle, and high import intensity and rate of productivity growth,
respectively.
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Table 2 Estimation results for the relative labor demand function by import intensity and
rate of productivity growth, 1975 – 1990.
import intensity rate of productivity growth
Variable
a) low middle high low middle high
constant –1.390** –.499** –1.138* –.264 –.829** –.826**
(.320) (.181) (.464) (.587) (.186) (.270)
trend –.032** –.030** –.037** –.022** –.029** –.040**
(.002) (.002) (.003) (.006) (.001) (.002)
lnwt
r
− 1 –.521** –.220 –.369 –.349 –.592** .144
(.190) (.131) (.205) (.257) (.125) (.173)
ln(k/y)t–1 –.269* –.011 –.350 .053 –.119 –.135
(.128) (.079) (.191) (.260) (.078) (.114)
# obs 412 908 239 185 969 405
R
2 adj. .930 .936 .937 .931 .937 .939
Notes:
a) specification is the same as (5) in Table 1; low, middle and high refer to the different quartiles;
for definitions of variables see notes to Table 1.
b) disaggregation of industries by import intensity and rate of productivity growth as described in
the text.
c) standard errors are given in parantheses below parameter estimates.
d) a star "*“ indicates significance at the 5% level, two stars "**“ at the 1% level.
                                          
18  The "middle" category aggregates industries falling into the second and third quartile.23
As the differences in estimated coefficients on the time trend show, the autonomous
decline of unskilled labor in industries characterized by relatively high import
shares has occurred at a somewhat faster pace (3.7% per year) than in the other
manufacturing sectors which experienced a reduction in the skills ratio of about 3%.
The trend decline of the skills ratio in industries with a low or medium degree of
import penetration was quite similar in the observation period, though.
The point estimate of the substitution elasticity of about –0.5 is above average in
industries with relatively low import shares, compared to about –0.37 in industries
with high import competition.  However, the latter elasticity seems rather
imprecisely estimated (with a standard error of .205)
19, and it is thus not clear
whether there is in fact a statistically significant difference between these two
sectors.  The same caveat applies to the estimation results with respect to the
capital/output ratio whose negative effect on the skills ratio seems to be of similar
size both in industries with a relatively low and high degree of import penetration.
In industries with import shares falling in–between these two sectors the coefficient
on the earnings ratio is only marginally significant, and the capital/output ratio does
seem to have a statistically significant effect on the relative demand for unskilled
workers.
The estimation results for the subsamples of industries defined by the rate of total
factor productivity growth show that the autonomous decline of the skill ratio in
industries with high growth rates in the observation period was markedly higher
than in the other sectors.  In the former sector, the trend decline in the relative
demand of unskilled labor was 4% per year, almost double the rate experienced in
industries characterized by low rates of technological change. The importance of
relative earnings for determining the relative demand for skilled and unskilled labor
at the industry level also depends on the rate of technological change.  The
substitution elasticity has its highest absolute value in industries where the rate of
technological change neither is particular high nor low.  In the latter industries this
elasticity is very imprecisely estimated, which is probably due to the small number
of remaining observations in this sector.  On the other hand, in industries with high
rates of productivity growth changes in relative earnings seem to have no
statistically significant effect on the relative demand for unskilled labor (the point
estimate is even positive).
                                          
19  The large standard error can be explained by the relatively small number of observations
remaining in this sector.24
5 Conclusions
We started from the observation that the German unemployment problem is closely
related to the dramatic decline of the employment of unskilled labor in the
manufacturing sector since the mid–1970's.  This decline occured in all industries
within West German manufacturing, but to a varying degree.  Although the
reduction in the relative supply of unskilled labor has certainly contributed to this
development, it is only part of the story.  The decline in the relative demand for
unskilled labor has also played an important role.  On theoretical grounds, it seems
likely that both intensified international competition from low–wage countries and
skill–biased technological change have adversely affected the demand for unskilled
labor.  Given the rigidity of relative wages due to the wage setting institutions
prevailing in Germany, this will be transmitted to less employment and higher
unemployment of unskilled labor.  The differential labor market developments in
the U.S. and Germany seem to support the hypothesis of a trade–off between more
jobs for unskilled workers on the one hand, and a less equal earnings distribution on
the other.  However, there has been very little previous empirical research on this
hypothesis for the German case.
This paper has confirmed the stylized fact that the earnings of unskilled relative to
skilled workers in West German manufacturing have on average remained rather
stable within the last 20 years or so, although there have been some modest changes
between and within industries.  Even in industries which had to face high import
competition, relative earnings of unskilled workers hardly changed in the
observation period.  On the other hand, unskilled workers in industries which
experienced relatively little technological change could improve their relative
earnings position, while those in industries with high productivity growth rates saw
their relative earnings declining.  However, compared to the dramatic decline of the
employment share of unskilled workers in virtually all manufacturing industries, the
changes in relative earnings appear rather modest.
On the basis of a simple econometric model, we have analyzed the economic factors
which have contributed to this dramatic decline of the employment share of
unskilled labor, in particular the extent to which the rigidity of relative earnings
may have affected the skills ratio in manufacturing industries.  We find that a
reduction of the earnings of unskilled relative to skilled workers by 10% would
increase the relative employment level of the unskilled on average by about 3%.
Hence, the substitution of unskilled by skilled labor due to differences in relative
earnings seems to have been modest compared to the the trend decline in the skills
ratio. According to our estimates, this decline has been about 3% per year for the
whole manufacturing sector in the observation period and may have been caused by
various factors, in particular the general reduction in the supply of unskilled labor25
and skill–biased technological change common to all industries and experience
groups.
As to the potential effects of intensified international competition and technological
change, we have found some evidence for the hypothesis that, other things equal,
the relative employment of unskilled workers in industries with high import shares
has declined more strongly than in those little affected by international competition,
but the size of this effect is not dramatic.  There is also some evidence which seems
to support the hypothesis that the relative employment decline of unskilled workers
in industries characterized by relatively high rates of technological change has been
somewhat stronger than on average, but this effect, too, explains relatively little of
the overall decline in the skills ratio.  Furthermore, since the degree of international
competition and the rate of technological change are probably interrelated, it seems
difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle these two effects.
In view of the U.S. experience, what effects on the employment of unskilled labor
could we possibly expect from a hypothetical more dramatic change in relative
earnings?  Given our estimates of the substitution elasticity between unskilled and
skilled labor in West German manufacturing, the likely employment effect of such a
change would be noticeable, but certainly not dramatic.  Even reductions in the
relative earnings of unskilled workers on a scale observed for the U.S. labor market
in the 1980's would not be sufficient to bring employment of unskilled workers in
West German manufacturing back to the levels we observed in the past, although
they could counter the autonomous decline in relative employment of unskilled
labor. Of course, given the German wage setting institutions, such large–scale wage
reductions seem very unlikely.  Furthermore, the welfare implications of such a
wage policy seem questionable because the pure substitution effect would work
against skilled workers and the overall employment effect remains undetermined.
The present study is just a first step towards a more general explanation of
employment and earnings trends in the German economy.  Such an analysis would
have to take into account the expansion of the service sector and the strong increase
in female labor force participation.  At least for Germany, very little is known about
employment and earnings determination in the service sector and how it is affected
by technological change, in particular the ubiquitous spread of information
technology.  Given the continuing decline in the demand for unskilled labor in
manufacturing, expansion of the service sector is widely considered to be the only
possible solution to the German unemployment problem.  However, to foster
employment growth in the service sector would probably require a more flexible
wage structure and changes in institutional regulations.  At the moment, we know
very little about this.26
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Data Appendix
This study matches sectoral information from the disaggregated national accounts
and individual–level employment as well as earnings information from the
Employment Register of the Federal Labour Office, the so–called "IAB–
Beschäftigtenstichprobe",  IABS for short (for details see Steiner and Wagner,
1996).  The IABS is a 1% random sample of all dependently employed persons
living in Germany who are covered by the social security system.  The data base
from which the IABS is drawn includes about 80 percent of all employed people in
Germany.  In each of these years, about 200,000 individuals were randomly
sampled from the population.  For our empirical analysis, the sample is restricted to
full-time employed males in manufacturing, apprentices are excluded.  Females are
not considered here because the data do not contain information on hours worked.
Aside from the very large sample size, the greatest advantage of the IABS is its
supposedly reliable earnings data.  Employers are legally requested to report
earnings of their employees covered by the social security system to the Federal
Bureau of Labor.  This information is then passed on to the social security agencies
where it is used as the basis for the calculation of the amount of the public pension
of each covered employee.  (This data base is, therefore, also referred to as social
security data.)  The exact amount of gross earnings has to be reported, and there are
legal sanctions for false reporting by the employer.  However, there are also some
shortcomings of the earnings data in the IABS. First, earnings do not include social
security contribution paid directly by the employer.  Second, fringe benefits are
included, but cannot be separated from "normal" earnings.  Since the way fringe
benefits are reported in the IABS has changed between 1983 and 1984, there is a
severe break in the earnings data.  However, except for graduates this does not
affect the median of the earnings distribution for (see Steiner and Wagner, 1996),
which we use as our earnings measure here.
The IABS contains information on an individual's vocational/educational
qualification and age.  This information is used to construct skill groups as defined
by the level of formal qualification and labor market experience.  For the empirical
analysis, the six vocational/ educational groups listed in Table A1 are aggregated
into three: no vocational/education degree (1), vocational degree/higher education
(2), (3) and (5), and university/polytechnical degree (4) and (6).  Following usual
practice, we define an individual’s potential labor market experience as: age  –
years of schooling – six years.  Years of schooling are derived from the highest
vocational/ educational degree as summarized in Table A1.30




(1) No vocational degree, no higher education 10
(2) Vocational degree, but no university entry level degree 
a) 12.125
(3) University entry level degree 13
(4) Polytechnical degree 
b) 15
(5) Vocational degree and university entry level degree 15.125
(6) University degree 18
a) "allgemeine/fachgebundene Hochschulreife"
b) "Fachhochschulabschluss
Source: Steiner and Wagner (1996).
The IABS also contains information on an individual’s industry affiliation at the
three digit–level, which can be aggregated to the two–digit level available in the
national account data referred to below.  The resulting 30 two–digit industries
comprising the manufacturing sector are listed in Table A2.  The last two columns
of the table contain the classsification industries by quartile of import share and
growth rate of total factor productivity, respectively.
From the disaggregated yearly national account data provided on tape by the
Federal Statistical Offices we obtained infomation on the real gross output, its price
level, real value added, nominal intermediate inputs, and the real value of the capital
stock in each industry.  An implicit price index for intermediate inputs for each
industry was derived by dividing nominal intermediate inputs by the difference
between real gross output and real value added.  The user costs of capital were
provided by Betrand Koebel and calculated as described in Koebel (1996). He also
provided us with a measure of total factor productivity growth for each industry
based on a modified growth accounting procedure as described in Diewert and
Wales (1992, p. 719).31
Table A2. Industry Classification in the IABS and in the National Accounts (NA)




9–10 14 Chemical Products 3 4
11 15 Petroleum Products 3 1
12 16 Synthetic Materials 2 4
13 17 Rubber Products 3 3
14 18 Stone and Clay 1 4
15 19 Fine Ceramics 3 3
16 20 Glass 2 4
17 21 Iron 3 2
18 22 Non–ferrous Metals 4 2
19 23 Foundry 1 2
20–21 24 Transforming Metal 1 2
22–24 25 Fabricated Metal 1 3
25–27 26 Machinery 2 2
28–30 28 Vehicles and Repairs 2 3
31 29 Shipbuilding 2 2
32 30 Airplanes and Space Shuttles 4 1
33 27 Data Processing and Office Equipment 4 4
34 31 Electrical Appliances and Repairs 2 4
35–36 32 Precision and Optical Instruments 4 4
37 33 Metal Products 2 3
38–39 34 Musical Instruments, Toys, Jewelry 4 1
40 35 Woodwork 3 1
41–42 36 Wood Processing 1 3
43 37–38 Paper 3 2
44 39 Printing and Publishing 1 3
45–46 40 Leather 4 1
47–51 41 Textiles 4 3
52–53 42 Apparel 3 1
54–57 43–44 Food, Beverages 2 1
58 45 Tobacco 1 1
Note:  Quartiles with respect to an industrie's import share (TFPG = rate of total factor productivity
growth) are denoted by 1 to 4, where 1 refers to an industry belonging to the lowest quartile and
4 to the highest quartile. The industries 15, 27, 29, 30, 34, 42 and 45 (NA–classification) are32
dropped in the regressions because of an insufficient number of observations in the respective
industry∗ skillgroup∗ experience group cell.